This paper considers a model of competition in prices and price complexity levels, which accommodates concave and convex confusion technologies. In symmetric equilibrium, the probability of using high complexity increases in the number of …rms. In the limit, as the number of competitors goes to in…nity, …rms use high complexity almost surely but the impact on consumer welfare depends on the characteristics of the confusion technology. Speci…cally, industry pro…ts converge to the highest level with concave confusion technologies and to the lowest level when with convex confusion technologies. An improvement in consumer sophistication increases consumer welfare but does not reduce market complexity.
Introduction
In many retail markets, …rms commonly use technical or involved language in their price disclosures, partitioned prices, or di¤erentiated price formats, which make it harder for consumers to identify the best o¤er. Price complexity is prevalent in markets for …nancial and banking products and energy retail. Although, it may be regarded as a benign by-product of intrinsic product complexity, recent research has raised concerns about its strategic use to soften price competition. In nearly homogeneous product markets, price complexity has been associated with consumer ignorance, inertia, lack of sophistication, dispersion in prices and price formats, positive mark-ups, and unintended responses to increased competitive pressure, such as lower transparency for consumers.
Discussing the challenges of consumer …nancial regulation, Campbell (2016) points out that "…nancial ignorance is pervasive and unsurprising given the complexity of modern …nan-cial products". The 2015 UK Competition and Market Authority investigation of the retail banking market found that price complexity may prevent consumers from receiving good value and identifying the best deals. A 2007 EC study of EU mortgage credit markets and the 2011 report by the UK Independent Commission on Banking echo these concerns. 1 There is mounting evidence that …rms use price complexity to exploit consumer bounded rationality.
Strategic price complexity draws on consumers' behavioral biases and on di¤erences in their sophistication levels. To assess and compare complex prices, consumers need to spend more time and/or e¤ort, and some are more likely to make mistakes or suboptimal choices due to confusion. Strategic …rms may deliberately increase price complexity to create consumer confusion and soften competition in nearly homogeneous product markets. 2 Research in psychology and economics has shown that consumers' decisions are sensitive to the way in which di¤erent alternatives are presented and to the di¢ culty of the choice environment.
A recent theoretical literature explores the role of price and choice complexity in homogeneous product markets, see Spiegler (2016) for a synthesis. These models send a consistent message that complexity and equilibrium obfuscation increase in response to intensi…ed competition, weakening its positive e¤ects, and identify the possibility that an increase in the number of …rms harms consumer welfare. 1 For instance, Woodward and Hall (2012) show that, in US mortgage markets, deals with the arrangement fee rolled into the interest rate are better than those that quote these fees separately. For a recent discussion of related empirical work, see Campbell (2016) . 2 Both experimental economics and marketing research show that more fragmented multi-part tari¤s can limit price comparability, create confusion, and lead to suboptimal consumer choices. See Kalayc¬and Potters (2011), Kalayc¬(2015) , and the review by Greenleaf et al. (2015) . This paper develops a richer modelling framework to accommodate more general confusion technologies, and address some key questions. Is the degree of complexity a good indicator of market performance? Does an increase in consumer sophistication increase market transparency? Under what conditions does an increase in the number of competitors harm consumer welfare? What type of tests can be used to assess the impact of competition on welfare? Robust answers to these questions are crucial to the policy relevance of extant …ndings.
This analysis focuses on homogeneous product oligopoly markets where …rms compete in price and price complexity. Like in Carlin (2009) , complexity makes it more di¢ cult to assess prices and compare o¤ers, and prevents some consumers from identifying the best deal.
Given …rms'complexity choices, some consumers are 'informed'or 'experts', while others are 'confused'. The experts are able to assess all prices and purchase the lowest-price product. The confused buy from a randomly selected …rm (or make random errors). The shares of experts and confused consumers depend on …rms'price complexity choices. A unilateral incremental increase in a …rm's price complexity increases the share of confused as it raises the di¢ culty of assessing price o¤ers.
A distinctive feature of our extended model is that it allows a …rm's price complexity to have a non-trivial impact on the di¢ culty of assessing a competitor's o¤er and can accommodate a wider gamut of consumer behaviors. The increase in the share of confused triggered by an increase in a …rm's price complexity may be either reduced or magni…ed by the complexity of rivals' price o¤ers. Speci…cally, this analysis considers confusion technologies which are either convex or concave in …rms' aggregate price complexity choice. One interpretation of this model is that an increase in complexity raises the cost of gathering market-wide information and dissuades more consumers from assessing o¤ers. 3 Then, convexity or concavity in confusion can be related to convexity or concavity of the cost of gathering market-wide price information.
As an illustration, consider a …rm which increases the complexity of its price o¤er by including more technical terms or using more sophisticated jargon. In a situation where there is learning by doing, the e¤ect of an incremental increase in complexity would be smaller if rivals'aggregate complexity were higher. Consumers may get better at deciphering technical language the more they are exposed to it, and so there would be some reciprocal cancellation of …rms' complexity levels. On the other hand, in a situation where consumers are more likely to be demoralized or make mistakes as the informational load increases, the e¤ect of an incremental increase in complexity may be larger when rivals'aggregate complexity is higher.
In this setting, price complexity underlies consumer heterogeneity and in symmetric equilibrium …rms choose prices randomly from a closed interval, according to a continuous distribution function. 4 Moreover, there is a positive relationship between prices and complexity levels: when a …rm sets a relatively low price, it bene…ts from more transparency, while when it sets a relatively high price, it bene…ts from more confusion. Despite product homogeneity, prices are strictly above marginal cost and expected pro…ts are strictly positive.
A duopoly analysis introduces some preliminary results, showing that an increase in the convexity of the confusion technology (or a reduction in its concavity) leads to an increase in transparency, a decrease in the lowest price associated with low complexity, a (weak) increase in the lowest price associated with high complexity, a decrease in average prices and expected industry pro…ts, and an increase in expected consumer surplus. Intuitively, a deviation to low complexity and a lower price is relatively more pro…table when the confusion technology is less concave or more convex, as a larger decrease in rivals'confusion e¤ectiveness triggers a larger increase in the share of experts.
An increase in consumer sophistication decreases average prices and expected pro…ts at both …rm and industry level. However, it has no impact on the frequency of using low complexity. From a consumer policy perspective, programmes that raise consumer awareness or understanding of the market (e.g., …nancial literacy programmes) boost consumer surplus but do not reduce the overall complexity of the market. This suggests that market transparency is not a good indicator of the e¤ectiveness of consumer awareness initiatives or, more generally, of how well a market performs.
The analysis of oligopoly markets indicates that an increase in the number of …rms leads to an increase in each …rm's probability of using high complexity and so to lower market transparency. In relatively concentrated markets, expected industry pro…t is not monotonic in the number of …rms. In highly fragmented markets, if the confusion technology is concave, expected share of confused and industry pro…ts are bounded away from zero and converge to the highest possible level as the number of competitors goes to in…nity. In contrast, if the confusion technology is convex, expected number of confused consumers and industry pro…ts converge to zero. These …ndings suggest that standard competition policy may back…re in relatively concentrated markets and be undesirable in fragmented markets where the confusion technology is concave in the complexity level.
Drawing on the interpretation that concavity in confusion relates to the concavity of the information gathering cost, our …ndings suggest that consumer learning by doing may not improve market performance in highly competitive environments. Indeed it may coexist with poor outcomes for consumers, as it is compatible with highly e¤ective confusion technologies.
On the other hand, highly fragmented markets with convex confusion technologies may perform well. More generally, when competitive pressure is high, although …rms use the high complexity almost surely, the impact of complexity on market performance and an e¤ective policy approach depend crucially on the confusion technology characteristics.
This analysis is related to those in Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) , when price complexity is the main source of confusion, and especially to Carlin (2009). 5 The latter analyzes the impact of complexity on market transparency in a model where …rms choose complexity levels from a closed interval. Carlin assumes that the confusion technology is linear in the aggregate price complexity. Our analysis complements his work by considering second order e¤ects in confusion and showing that these have policy implications.
Using the results in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) , Carlin (2009) proves the existence of a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, where …rms only use the highest and lowest complexity levels. Drawing on this result, our analysis also revisits the setting with no second order e¤ects to characterize …rms'pricing strategies and pro…ts in the unique symmetric equilibrium. Our …ndings indicate that the convergence properties of expected industry pro…ts in a model with no second order e¤ects are a limiting case, qualitatively consistent with the concave confusion technology case. Piccione and Spiegler (2012) explore a general comparability structure in a duopoly model where consumers enter the market with a default bias, and identify a necessary and su¢ cient condition for …rms to earn max-min pro…ts in equilibrium. In their setting, consumers are initially attached to one …rm and can only make price comparisons when formats are compatible. The model presented here can also be interpreted as one where default-biased consumers are randomly shared across …rms and make market-wide price comparisons with a probability which depends on the overall market complexity. Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) analyze an oligopoly framework where …rms can choose one of two price presentation formats. We show that an increase in the number of …rms induces …rms to rely more on frame complexity and 5 More broadly, this article contributes to the literature on behavioral industrial economics, in particular, to work that explores the interaction between strategic …rms and boundedly rational consumers. See Spiegler (2011 ), Grubb (2015 , and Heidhues and Koszegi (2018) for related discussions and surveys of recent work. Armstrong (2008) provides a thorough discussion of policy issues. may harm consumer welfare. In these analyses, the emphasis is on the price comparability structure and how it is a¤ected by price presentation. 6 A di¤erent branch of literature explores strategic obfuscation in sequential search models with fully rational consumers. In Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) , consumers' search costs are strictly convex in shopping time. They argue that strict convexity of the disutility of time is a realistic assumption because 'disutility would be convex in a standard time allocation model with decreasing returns to leisure'. But, they also note that the consideration of cost concavity might be a more suitable if there is consumer learning by doing. 7
Next section formulates the model, introduces a taxonomy of confusion technologies, and discusses its microfoundations. Section 3 presents some preliminary results, while section 4 illustrates the equilibrium derivation and basic …ndings in a duopoly model. Section 5 characterizes the unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in the general oligopoly model. Section 6 focuses on comparative statics and convergence results, and discusses consumer protection and competition policy implications. All proofs missing from the text are relegated to the appendices.
Model
Consider a market for a homogeneous product with n 2 identical …rms. Marginal costs of production are constant and normalized to zero. There is a unit mass of consumers, each demanding at most one unit of the product and willing to pay at most v = 1. 8 Firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose prices, p i for i 2 N = f1; 2; :::ng, and the complexity of their prices. There are two possible complexity levels and each …rm can choose just one of them, k i 2 fk; kg, where k > k. The pro…le of …rms' price complexity choices is k, an n-vector whose i-th component is k i . Complexity is related to the way in which …rms convey price information and can be adjusted at the same time as prices, which is re ‡ected by the timing. 9
A reduced-form model which may accommodate di¤erent interpretations is introduced …rst where complexity increases the di¢ culty of assessing …rms'price o¤ers and is a source of 6 Closer to Carlin (2009) , the current analysis considers a two stage process where complexity focuses consumers'attention and may dissuade them completely from making price comparisons.
7 See also Wilson (2010) and Taylor (2017) for related analyses of obfuscation. 8 The normalizations of marginal costs and reservation values are made for expositional ease and without loss of generality.
9 Price complexity in this setting is a form of 'price framing'. Alternatively, …rms may engage in 'product framing' -a form of spurious product di¤erentiation, e.g., involving decisions on product size or packagingwhich cannot be adjusted as frequently as prices and is better captured by a sequential move framework. See the related discussion in Chioveanu and Zhou (2013). consumer confusion. 10 Based on …rms complexity choices, there are two types of consumers, experts (or informed) and confused (or uninformed). The experts purchase the cheapest product that provides positive surplus, while the confused buy at random, so that they choose a particular …rm with probability 1=n. The model is also consistent with a default-bias interpretation, whereby each consumer is initially assigned to one …rm and the …rms have equal bases of consumers ex-ante. In this case, confused consumers uphold their default option, while the experts select the cheapest alternative.
The …rms'price complexity levels determine the share of experts in the market, which is assumed to be a symmetric function. Due to symmetry, for a given k, the fractions of experts and confused are solely determined by n m, the count of k in k (or alternatively, by m, the count of k in k) where m 2 f0; 1; :::ng. Hence, the share of experts can be written as a function,
This analysis considers markets, like those for …nancial or banking products, where there are always some expert consumers, although it allows all consumers to be confused if all …rms use k. Speci…cally, the share of experts when n m …rms use k is (n m) 0, with strict inequality for m 1. Denote (n) min and, for simplicity, let (0) = 1. 11 By making it more di¢ cult to assess …rms'o¤ers, an increase in one …rm's price complexity increases the fraction of confused in the market, so
To capture the impact of a rival's price complexity on the di¢ culty of evaluating a …rm's o¤er, let
for all m and > 1. This formulation parametrizes the rate of change of the incremental share of experts, which is summarized by ( 1), and provides a tractable way to explore more general confusion technologies. If > 2 ( < 2), a unilateral incremental increase in complexity is more (less) e¤ective when the rivals' complexity is higher (lower), i.e. …rms' complexity levels reinforce (o¤set) each other in creating confusion. Speci…cally, depending on the value of 6 = 2, (2) provides a taxonomy of confusion technologies.
Case 1 Concavity. When 1 < < 2, the confusion technology (1 ) is concave in the number of complex prices in the market. Formally, (1) and (2) imply that
so that a …rm's incremental increase in price complexity is more e¤ ective in creating confusion when rivals' price complexity is lower (in the sense that fewer competitors employ k).
Case 2 Convexity. When > 2, the confusion technology (1 ) is convex in the number of complex prices in the market. Formally, (1) and (2) imply that
so that a …rm's incremental increase in price complexity is more e¤ ective when rivals' price complexity is higher.
The LHS di¤erences in Cases 1 and 2 capture the increase in the share of confused triggered by a unilateral increase in complexity when n m 1 other …rms use k (and m rivals use k), while the RHS di¤erences capture the corresponding increase when n m other …rms use k (and m rivals use k):
Expression (2) implies that
Then it follows that
The share of confused for given n m can be expressed in terms of the primitives of the model: the market structure (n), the curvature ( ), and the degree of consumer sophistication as measured by the highest possible share of confused consumers (1 min ). 12
Case 3 No Second Order E¤ ects. When = 2, the price complexity of one …rm does not a¤ ect the e¤ ectiveness of an increase in a rival's complexity. Formally, (1) and (2) imply that
This case is closely related to Carlin (2009) and (3) is replaced by
The main analysis focuses on 6 = 2; but a characterization of the equilibrium for = 2 is included at the end of section 5 and the policy discussion in section 6 covers all cases.
As the share of experts is assumed to be a symmetric function of …rms'price complexity levels, in the setting above it is expressed as a function of the count of k in k. Alternatively, the share of experts could be written as a function of the pro…le of …rms' price complexity choices, '(k). Then, Case 1 corresponds to a situation where there is substitutability in confusion, that is, the confusion technology (1 ') satis…es strictly decreasing di¤erences, while Case 2 corresponds to a situation where there is complementarity in confusion, that is, the confusion technology (1 ') satis…es strictly increasing di¤erences. 13 A more detailed description of this alternative formulation is relegated to the online appendix.
A Microfoundation of Consumer Confusion
The reduced form model can be related to an environment where consumers have limited time availability and incur a time cost to assess …rms'o¤ers, so that they use a two-step approach.
Depending on their time availability and the overall market complexity, they …rst decide if to collect information on prices or not. The consumers can directly observe the overall market complexity: for instance, they may receive information amalgamated by the media or social networks or transmitted via word-of-mouth. However, they do not observe individual …rms' complexity levels unless they decide to collect information. Complexity focuses consumers' attention to this particular aspect and may dissuade them from gathering price information.
When a consumer decides to gather information, they buy the lowest-price product. When a consumer decides not to collect price information, they select a product randomly or uphold their default-option.
Consumers have time availability t, which is a random variable, and incur a time cost to assess …rms'o¤ers and identify the best deal. Let t be distributed on an interval [t L ; t H ] according to a continuous probability distribution function G(t), with G 0 (t) > 0. 14 Let (n m) be consumers' cost of gathering information where n m is the count of k in k and measures market-wide complexity. Suppose that it is more costly for consumers to assess price information when more …rms use k, that is, (n m) < (n m + 1). 15 Then, if t > (n m), consumers gather information on all price o¤ers and choose the best deal. This happens with probability 1 G( (n m)). If t < (n m), consumers choose a random product or uphold their default option. This happens with probability G( (n m)):
The resulting share of confused is 1 (n m) = G( (n m)) :
In the examples below, consumers'time availability is a draw from a uniform distribution.
It can be checked that (5) holds. For 2 (1; 2) and > 2, (n m) identi…es a concave and, respectively, convex cost sequence.
Using (2) and (5), consistency requires that in this example
Like in the previous example, consistency with the reduced form model requires that
In Example 1, concavity of the confusion technology (Case 1) captures learning-by-doing in the market. In contrast, convexity of the confusion technology (Case 2) captures an environment where there is information processing overload: consumers are increasingly likely to give up as aggregate complexity increases.
Our reduced form model is closely related to the frameworks in Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) . However, these papers analyze the impact of price complexity (and, more generally, price framing) on the comparability structure. In contrast, the microfoundation presented above focuses on markets where consumers use a two-stage decision making process and where strategic price complexity directs consumer attention on this particular feature of the market. Here, complexity makes gains from comparisons or switching less obvious and may discourage information gathering or reinforce inertia.
Below alternative conceptual foundations for Cases 1 and 2 are discussed.
Complexity as a Source of Errors. Suppose that the presence of complex prices increases the probability that consumers make a random choice error. Consider a market where exactly n m …rms are using the highest complexity ( k), with m n 1: Suppose that the probability that consumers make a random error (which may be due to upholding a default-option) because …rm i uses k is given by n m 2 (0; 1) and is identical but independent of the probability that they get confused because …rm j uses k. 16 Then, the overall probability that consumers get confused when facing n m complex prices is 1 (1 n m ) n m , which implies that (n m) = (1 n m ) n m . Using (3), consistency requires
Example 3 Concavity of Confusion Technology. Suppose that n m = for all m. Then (n m) = (1 ) n m satis…es (1) and the confusion technology is concave, i.e. Case 1 applies.
In this case, the e¤ectiveness of confusion (as given by ) is constant, but the pool of consumers that a …rm can confuse by increasing its price complexity from k to k is decreasing in the number of competitors which use complex prices. For example, when only one rival uses k, the 'target' group of a …rm is (1 ), whereas when two rivals use k, the 'target' group shrinks to (1 ) 2 . Intuitively, the confusion technology is concave also when n m is decreasing in (n m) as then, when more rivals use complex prices, a …rm not only faces a smaller target group but also is less e¤ective.
The discussion above shows that a necessary condition for the confusion technology to be convex is n m > n (m+1) , i.e., the probability that consumers make a random error when any …rm i uses k must increase in the number of complex prices. This may be the case, for instance, if consumers are more likely to make an error when the choice environment is more di¢ cult. The following numerical example illustrates this case.
Example 4 Convexity of Confusion Technology. Let n = 4, = 3, and (1 min ) = 0:5. Then, using (6), 1 = 0:0125 ( (1) = 0:9875), 2 = 0:0250 ( (2) = 0:95), 3 = 0:0573 ( (3) = 0:8375), and 4 = 0:1591. It is then easy to check that Case 2 applies.
Preliminary Findings
Given competitors'price and price complexity choices (p i ; k i ), …rm i's ex post pro…t can be written as
where …rm i's share of informed consumers, q i (p i ; p i ), is given below.
The …rst term in square brackets in i is …rm i's share of confused consumers, while the second term is …rm i's share of experts. All experts buy from …rm i if its price is strictly lower than rivals' prices. If …rm i and other …rms tie at the lowest price, then they share equally the experts. If at least one …rm j 6 = i o¤ers a price p j lower than p i , then …rm i does not sell to experts.
Although confused consumers are unable to accurately compare prices, they do not pay more than their valuation. If …rms charge prices above v = 1, the consumers would realize at checkout (or after purchase) and decline the purchase (or return the product free of cost).
Therefore, in this setting, …rms have no incentives to charge prices in excess of consumers'willingness to pay. Moreover, confused consumers do not infer prices from price complexity levels.
So, even if high complexity were consistently associated with higher prices, consumers would not understand this relationship. If consumers participate infrequently in the market, they may not have a chance to learn about this relationship. For instance, some consumers only take few mortgages in their lifetime, or change their gas and electricity providers infrequently.
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium where all …rms use pure price complexity strategies.
Proof. (a) Suppose all …rms choose k for sure (that is, there are (0) = 1 experts).
Then, …rms would compete á la Bertrand and make zero pro…t. But, if a …rm unilaterally deviates to k and a positive price (no greater than one), it makes strictly positive pro…t. A contradiction. 
(c) Suppose all …rms choose k for sure (that is, there are (n) = min experts). If min > 0, the argument in (b) applies unchanged. If min = 0, then in the unique candidate equilibrium p i = 1 and i = 1=n for all i. But then if a …rm unilaterally deviates to k and price
Lemma 1 implies that in any candidate equilibrium at least one …rm randomizes its price complexity. Therefore, with positive probability …rms face both expert and confused consumers. The con ‡ict between the incentives to fully exploit confused consumers and to vigorously compete for the experts rules out equilibria involving pure price strategies. The proof of the following result is standard and therefore omitted. 17
Lemma 2 There is no equilibrium where all …rms use pure pricing strategies.
Lemmas 1 and 2 show that in any equilibrium there must be dispersion in both price complexities and prices. A …rm's strategy space is [0; 1] fk; kg. Denote by i i (p i ; k i ) …rm i's mixed strategy over price and price complexity. This analysis focuses on symmetric mixed strategies, where F (p) is the marginal c.d.f. of …rms'random prices, de…ned on an interval S [0; 1], and (p) and 1 (p) are the probabilities that price p 2 S is associated with complexity level k and k, respectively. Then, the overall probability of using k is R p2S (p)dF (p) 2 (0; 1). The following result presents properties of …rms'pricing strategies.
Lemma 3 In symmetric equilibrium, (i) the support of the pricing distribution (S) is a connected interval; (ii) if min > 0 the pricing c.d.f. is continuous everywhere, while if min = 0, it is continuous everywhere except possibly at the upper bound of S; and (iii) inf S = p 0 > 0 and sup S = 1.
Next section builds on these …ndings to characterize the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Section 4 illustrates the approach in a simple duopoly framework and presents some preliminary comparative statics results. Section 5 analyses a general oligopoly model, while section 6 discusses competition and consumer protection policy implications, by combining analytical results and numerical simulations.
Duopoly Analysis
Consider a duopoly market and suppose …rm j 6 = i follows the mixed strategy j presented in section 3. At a given price p j , …rm j uses the lowest complexity k with probability (p j ) and the highest complexity with probability 1 (p j ). Firm j's price is a random draw from its price c.d.f. Then, …rm i's pro…t at price p p 0 = min S > 0 and complexity k is given by
For a given realization of rival's price p j , the …rst square bracket gives the expected share of experts. If …rm j also uses k, which happens with probability (p j ), the share of experts is (0); if, instead, it uses k, which happens with probability 1 (p j ), the share of experts is
(1). Similarly, for a given p j , the second square bracket gives the expected share of confused consumers. As …rm j's price p j is a random draw, these expected shares are integrated over the relevant realizations of p j . Firm i serves experts whenever the rival's price is higher (p j > p), whereas it serves half of the confused consumers for all p j 's.
Firm i's pro…t at price p and complexity k is
The terms in square brackets present the expected shares of experts and, respectively, confused consumers for a given realization of rival's price p j . However, in this case, if …rm j chooses the lowest complexity k -which happens with probability (p j ) -there are (1) experts and
(1 (1)) confused. If …rm j chooses the high complexity k -which happens with probability 1 (p j ) -then there are (2) = min experts and (1 (2)) = (1 min ) confused. Firm j's price p j is a random draw from its pricing c.d.f. The share of experts is integrated over all the price realizations where …rm i serves these consumers (i.e., for all p j > p). Firm i serves half of the confused consumers for all p j 's.
Substituting (0) = 1, and using (3), (7) and (8), the incremental pro…tability of an increase in complexity is
where
Evaluating (9) at p = p 0 and p = 1 gives, respectively,
(9) is strictly increasing in p. The …rst term in brackets (which is negative) decreases as p increases (the integration range is smaller), whereas the second term in brackets (which is positive) increases as p increases (the integration range is wider). To maximize its expected pro…t, …rm i chooses
where the threshold pricep follows from equating (9) to zero. So, in symmetric equilibrium, prices below a cut-o¤ levelp > p 0 are associated with complexity level k, while price abovep, are associated with k, and each …rm assigns probability = R 1
complexity level k and 1 to complexity level k. A formal proof of this result is presented in the next section for the general oligopoly model.
Suppose now that …rm j 6 = i uses the price complexity strategy identi…ed above and that F (p) satis…es Lemma 3. Then, …rm i's expected pro…ts at p = p 0 and when p !p are
whereas …rm i's expected pro…ts at p =p and p = 1 are
The expected pro…ts for an arbitrary price p are presented in the appendix. Constant pro…t conditions imply that in duopoly equilibrium the probability of using k and expected individual pro…t are given by
while the boundary prices p 0 andp are
Note thatp = 1 i¤ min = 0.
Finally, F (p) is implicitly determined by (k; p) = and ( k; p) = , and presented in the appendix. For min = 0, the price distribution has a mass point at the upper bound of its support as (1 F (1)) = 1= .
Proposition 1 In the unique symmetric duopoly equilibrium, …rms choose prices randomly according to the c.d.f. F (p) presented in (A1). Prices on [p 0 ;p) are associated with the low price complexity (k), while prices on [p; 1] are associated with the high price complexity k , with p 0 andp de…ned in (12). Each …rm chooses k with probability = F (p) and k with probability 1 . The probability is presented in (11), together with a …rm's expected equilibrium pro…t, .
For min > 0, symmetric equilibrium price c.d.f. is continuous everywhere. In contrast, for min = 0;p = 1 and the equilibrium price distribution is continuous for all p < 1, but has an atom at the upper bound as lim p%1 F (p) = ( 1)= < F (1) = 1. There is dispersion in both prices and price complexity levels, a positive relationship between prices and complexity, and …rms'strategies and market outcomes depend on both and min :
is related to the curvature of the confusion technology. When 2 (1; 2); an increase in translates into a reduction in the concavity of the confusion technology: a …rm's attempt to confuse consumers is thwarted to a lesser extent by rival's complexity choices. When > 2, an increase in corresponds to an increase in the convexity of the confusion technology, and so a …rm's attempt to confuse is magni…ed to a higher extent by competitor's complexity choice.
min is the share of expert consumers when both …rms use the high price complexity ( k) and measures consumer sophistication, with a higher value corresponding to higher rationality or sophistication. Corollary 1 In the symmetric duopoly equilibrium, the probability of using the low price complexity ( ) and expected share of confused increase in , the lower bound of the pricing c.d.f. (p 0 ) decreases in , the cut-o¤ price (p) increases in for min > 0 and is independent of for min = 0, expected individual pro…t ( ), expected industry pro…t (2 ), and the average price decrease in .
An increase in increases market transparency as …rms use k more frequently, and it boosts expected consumer surplus, as it decreases the average price. However, it also leads to more price dispersion (as it lowers p 0 ). As total welfare is constant (and normalized to one), a decrease in industry pro…t corresponds to an equal increase in consumer surplus. As increases, a …rm's incentive to use the high complexity is lower as it operates in an environment where strategic complexity is more e¤ective (or, at least, less ine¤ective). Figure 2 illustrates how the probability of using k and industry pro…t vary with , for given min . While average prices decrease in , it is less obvious how the average price conditional on low complexity varies with . For instance, in Figure 1 , an increase in from 3=2 to 3 triggers an increase in the cumulative probability at each price p which was assigned positive density for = 3=2 and also a decrease in p 0 . These two e¤ects indicate that the average price for = 3 is lower than that for = 3=2. However, the change in the average price conditional on low complexity is a¤ected by an additional e¤ect which partly o¤sets these two, as the cut-o¤ pricep increases in . Using (A1), the price distribution conditional on the price being below the cut-o¤ valuep and the corresponding conditional expected price are presented in the appendix. It can be checked that the expected price conditional on low complexity is not generally monotonic in . For instance, for min = 0:6, it increases for low values of and then decreases, while for min = 0, it monotonically decreases in . 18
Corollary 2 In symmetric duopoly equilibrium, the probability of using the low price complexity ( ) is independent of min , while the lower bound of the pricing c.d.f. (p 0 ), the cut-o¤ price (p), expected individual pro…t ( ), expected industry pro…t (2 ), expected share of confused, the average price, and the average price conditional on low complexity, all decrease in min .
Consumer policies which increase the degree of consumer sophistication, for instance, …nancial literacy programmes, decrease average prices and expected share of confused consumers, and increase expected consumer surplus. However, they increase price dispersion (by decreasing the lower bound of the pricing support, p 0 ) and do not a¤ect market transparency as re ‡ected by …rms'probability of choosing low complexity. These results suggest that market transparency and price dispersion may not be good indicators of the success of consumer education programmes or of market performance.
Oligopoly Equilibrium
This section characterizes the symmetric equilibrium in oligopoly markets. It mainly focuses on a framework where the confusion technology is either concave or convex in …rms' price complexity levels (where either < 2 or > 2), but also includes a variant without second order e¤ects ( = 2).
Consider an arbitrary …rm i 2 N . Suppose that …rm i's competitors follow the mixed strategy presented in section 2. So the competitors choose prices randomly from a distribution function F (p), which satis…es Lemma 3, the probability that a (random) price p is associated with the low complexity k is given by (p), and the probability that p is associated with high complexity k is 1 (p). Although …rm i's competitors choose prices from the same c.d.f., their price draws may be di¤erent and so the probabilities of using k may also be di¤erent across these …rms. 
the overall probability that out of n 1 rivals exactly m 0 use k and n m 1 use k).
Example 5 Let n = 3, N i = fj; lg, and p i = (p j ; p l ). Using (13),
. In this case, }(N i ) = f?; fjg; flg; fj; lgg, M 2 = fj; lg, M 1 = ffjg; flgg, and M 0 = f?g. 
The …rst term in i (p; k) corresponds to …rm i's pro…t on the expert consumer segment.
When out of n 1 rivals exactly m 0 use k and n m 1 use k, given that …rm i also employs k, there are (n m 1) experts. The …rst term in square brackets sums up over all values of m. Firm i serves experts only if its price is lower than rivals' prices, which is re ‡ected when integrating over p j > p for all j 6 = i. The second term is …rm i's pro…t on the confused consumer segment. Firm i serves a share 1=n of these consumers. The second term in square brackets sums the corresponding share of confused (1 (n m 1)) over all values of m. Firm i serves its share of confused regardless of rivals'prices, which is re ‡ected by integrating over p j > p 0 for all j 6 = i.
Using (13), …rm i's expected pro…t at price p and complexity k is
:
:::
The expression for i p; k is analogous to the one for i (p; k) ; with the di¤erence that, when exactly m 0 out of n 1 rivals use the lowest complexity k, as …rm i employs k, there are (n m) experts and (1 (n m)) confused.
The incremental pro…tability of an increase in complexity ( i p; k i (p; k)) is given by (n 1) p n Z 1 p :::
This expression can be simpli…ed using the following result which draws on (3).
Lemma 4 Suppose n 2 and m n 1. Let p i be the ex post price pro…le of …rm i's competitors and (p j ) [1 + (1 (p j ))( 2)], where p j is an element of p i . Then,
By (4), the incremental pro…tability of an increase in complexity becomes
This expression generalizes the incremental pro…tability of an increase in complexity presented in section 4, and similar reasoning leads to the next result.
Proposition 2 In symmetric mixed-strategy oligopoly equilibrium, a …rm's complexity level depends only on its price. The …rms choose prices according to a c.d.f. F (p) with support S = [p 0 ; 1]. If p <p, …rms choose complexity k, if p >p, …rms choose complexity k, and if p =p, …rms are indi¤ erent between the two complexity levels.
When a …rm chooses relatively low prices, it bene…ts from more market transparency, as it is more likely to serve the experts. In contrast, when a …rm chooses relatively high prices, it relies more on confused consumers and bene…ts from higher complexity. As a result, in equilibrium there is a positive relationship between prices and price complexity levels and a …rm's complexity choice is determined by its price draw. Each …rm assigns probability = F (p) 2 (0; 1) to complexity level k and 1 to complexity level k.
The proof of the next result uses the approach illustrated in section 4 and is relegated to the appendix. Drawing on Proposition 2, a …rm's expected pro…t for a price p 2 [p 0 ;p) (which is associated with low complexity, k) and for a price p 2 [p; 1] (which is associated with high complexity, k), and mixed strategy equilibrium constant pro…t conditions are also presented there. Recall that (n) = min .
Proposition 3
For n 2 and 6 = 2, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, where …rms choose prices randomly according to a c.d.f. F (p) de…ned on [p 0 ; 1] where p 0 > 0. Each …rm chooses complexity k with probability 1 = 1 F (p), where
and complexity k with probability . Each …rm's expected pro…t is
If min > 0, thenp < 1 and F (p) is continuous everywhere. If min = 0, thenp = 1 and F (p) is continuous for p 2 [p 0 ;p), but has an atom atp.
In homogeneous product markets, where …rms compete by simultaneously choosing prices and price complexity levels, there is dispersion in both dimensions in equilibrium. These …ndings are consistent with observed patters in markets for …nancial and banking products, or markets for gas and electricity. Firms make strictly positive pro…ts and charge prices in excess of marginal cost. The …rms' equilibrium strategies and market outcomes depend on market structure (as captured by n), the curvature of the confusion technology ( ), and the degree of consumer sophistication ( min ).
A Model without Second Order E¤ects
So far, the analysis has focused on 6 = 2. Below, a variant of the model where = 2 (and so there are no second order e¤ects) is discussed. The preliminary results in Lemmas 1-3 carry over unchanged. The = 2 case is closely related to Carlin (2009) , who analyses a market where "an individual …rm's complexity choice may add di¢ culty to the overall task of becoming informed, [but] does not magnify the e¤ect of other …rms'complexity choices on the cost of becoming informed". In Carlin's model the …rms choose complexity levels from a closed interval [k; k], but in symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium they randomize only between the extreme values of this interval. His analysis proves the existence of a cut-o¤ mixed strategy equilibrium. The next result fully characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium of a variant with only two price complexity levels (k i 2 fk; kg). The proof is relegated to the online appendix.
Proposition 4 For n 2 and = 2, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, where …rms choose prices randomly according to a c.d.f. F (p) de…ned on [p 0 ; 1] where p 0 > 0. Each …rm chooses complexity k with probability 1 = 1 F (p), given by
and complexity k with probability . Each …rm's equilibrium pro…t is given by
If min > 0, thenp < 1 and F (p) is continuous everywhere. If min = 0, thenp = 1 and F (p) is continuous for p 2 [p 0 ;p) but has an atom atp.
Discussion and Policy Implications
This section explores equilibrium comparative statics and convergence results, and discusses their implications for competition and consumer protection policy. It builds on Propositions 3 and 4, and focuses on the impact of changes in (i) competitive pressure as measured by the number of …rms (n); (ii) degree of consumer sophistication as measured by the lowest share of experts ( min ); and (iii) the concavity or convexity of the confusion technology as measured by the value of .
Corollary 3 In the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, the probability that each …rm assigns to the lowest complexity level k ( ) decreases in the number of …rms (n), is independent of the degree of consumer sophistication ( min ), and increases in the degree of concavity/convexity . Moreover, lim n!1 = 0.
In more fragmented markets, to o¤set the impact of increased competitive pressure, …rms rely more on consumer confusion and so choose high price complexity more frequently. In the limit, as the number of competitors goes to in…nity, …rms use high price complexity almost surely. Hence, in settings where …rms compete by choosing both prices and price complexity, an increase in the number of …rms leads to an increase in the overall complexity of the market. Like in the duopoly framework, the frequency with which …rms use low complexity is independent of consumers'degree of sophistication. As a result, initiatives which improve consumer awareness do not lead to reductions in the overall market complexity.
For a given market structure, a lower degree of concavity or higher degree of convexity in confusion technology leads to a decrease in market complexity. When 2 (1; 2), higher complexity of rivals' o¤ers partly o¤sets the increase in confusion resulting from a …rm's incremental complexity. However, as increases, this o¤setting e¤ect gets smaller and, as a …rm's incentives to choose high complexity are reduced, increases. When > 2, higher rival complexity magni…es the increase in confusion resulting from the incremental complexity of a …rm's o¤er. This creates a free-riding e¤ect and an increase in further weakens a …rm's incentives to use high complexity. Figure 3 provides an illustration. The equilibrium expected share of confused consumers is
For a given number of …rms, E[1 ] aggregates the shares of confused consumers in the sequence (1 (n m)) n m=0 , weighting each share by the overall probability that m …rms choose low complexity and n m …rms choose high complexity. Using (3) for 6 = 2 and (4) for = 2, equilibrium expected share of confused becomes
(1 min )
This analysis focuses on the impact of convexity or concavity of the confusion technology on market outcomes. For this reason, the comparative statics and convergence results discussed below assume that the lower bound of the share of experts in the market is independent of the number of …rms, i.e. (n) = min is a constant. This is equivalent to assuming that (1 min ) -the maximal share of confused consumers -is …xed regardless of the market structure. By …xing the maximal share of confused, when the number of …rms is increased, each of them is made smaller with respect to the market, as each …rm's maximal base of confused is then …xed at the level (1 min )= n. 19 The convergence properties of the expected share of confused consumers in fragmented markets depend on whether the confusion technology is concave or convex in …rms'complexity choices.
Corollary 4 In the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, the expected share of confused consumers in (19) decreases in min and
This corollary formalizes Carlin's intuition that the convergence results for the expected number of confused depend on the properties of the confusion technology. If the confusion technology is convex in …rms' complexity levels, the expected share of confused consumers converges to zero. For expositional ease, this analysis assumes that (0) = 1, that is, when all …rms use low complexity, there are no confused consumers. If (0) < 1, so that there is some confusion even when all …rms use low complexity, then in highly fragmented markets where > 2, the expected share of confused consumers would converge to the minimal level
(1 (0)) instead; see footnote 2. In contrast, if the confusion technology is concave in …rms' complexity levels ( 2 (1; 2)), the expected share of confused is bounded away from zero and converges to (1 min ). The concavity or convexity of the confusion technology in this model is captured by the sequence of shares (1 (n m)) n m=0 . A simple illustration is provided below.
Example 6 Let min = 0 and consider (3). If = 3, then, 1 (n m) = (2 n m 1)= (2 n 1) and lim n!1 (1 (n m)) = 2 m . If = 3=2, then 1 (n m) = (0:5 n m 1)= (0:5 n 1) and lim n!1 (1 (n m)) = 1.
Intuitively, in fragmented markets, convexity requires a relatively ine¤ective confusion technology and so, although …rms use almost surely high complexity (i.e., despite the lack of market transparency), the expected share of confused converges to zero. In contrast, concavity requires a relatively e¤ective confusion technology. If the confusion technology is concave, in highly fragmented markets, lack of transparency is aligned with a high expected share of confused consumers. This is also the case when there are no second order e¤ects in confusion, so the results for = 2 are qualitatively similar to those that obtain under concavity.
Beyond the convergence results presented in Corollary 4, numerical simulations indicate that the expected number of confused consumers increases monotonically in n for 2 (1; 2]. For = 2, this monotonicity result can be derived analytically using Corollary 3. For all > 2, E[1 ] decreases in n at least when n is large enough. For 3; its value at n = 2 is larger than the value at n = 3, and then E[1 ] decreases monotonically in n for n 3. 20
However, for 2 (2; 2:8) it peaks at some value n 0 ( ) 3. Numerical examples also indicate that the expected share of confused consumers strictly decreases in for given n and min .
Example 7 Let min = 0. Consider = 3=2, 2, or 3. The expected share of confused as a function of the number of …rms is illustrated in Figure 4 and presented in the appendix. As discussed, the analysis holds the minimal share of experts …xed, so market fragmentation does not have a direct impact on consumer sophistication. Suppose instead that min = (n) is a decreasing function of n. Then, the more fragmented the market, the lower the minimal share of experts is. This could be the case in a market where there is choice overload and consumers are more likely to make random choices when they face more options. Using (19), it is easy to see that the qualitative results in Corollary 4 carry over unchanged. For > 2, (1 (n)) is bounded above by 1, so that in the limit, the expected share of confused still goes to zero. For 2 (1; 2], the expected share of confused converges to lim n!1 (1 (n)) > (1 (2)) > 0. Now, suppose that (n) is an increasing function of n, that is, the more fragmented the market, the higher the minimal share of experts is.
Arguably, this is a less realistic case as it requires market structure to have a positive impact on consumer sophistication. For > 2, (1 (n)) is bounded below by zero, so the expected share of confused still converges to zero. However, for 2 (1; 2], the expected share of confused may converge to zero as almost all consumers are sophisticated in nearly competitive markets. 21
Corollary 5 In symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, expected industry pro…t ( n = n ) decreases in min , and is strictly larger than expected share of confused. Furthermore,
An increase in the level of consumer sophistication has a positive e¤ect on consumer surplus (as total welfare is normalized to one). Combined with the …ndings in Corollary 3, this implies that an improvement in consumer awareness boosts consumer welfare, but does not reduce overall market complexity. Hence, the insight from the duopoly model that market transparency is not a good indicator of market performance carries over to more fragmented environments. In nearly perfectly competitive markets, when the confusion technology is concave, or when it is linear (i.e., there are no second order e¤ects), expected industry pro…t is bounded away from zero. As total pro…t is larger than the expected share of confused, this result is closely related to Corollary 4. On the other hand, when the confusion technology is convex in complexity levels, expected pro…t converges to zero as the number of …rms goes to in…nity.
In this case, although …rms choose high complexity almost surely, confusion technology is relatively ine¢ cient and fragmented markets may be highly competitive.
In general, industry pro…t and implicitly consumer surplus are not monotonic in the number of …rms. An increase in competitive pressure gives …rms stronger incentives to undercut and attract the experts, but also to use more frequently high complexity ( k), which is associated with relatively higher prices. Numerical simulations also suggest that industry pro…t decreases in for given min and n. Figure 4 provides an illustration for min = 0. Numerical simulations provide further insights. Table 1 presents equilibrium outcomes for various values of n and , letting min = 0:6. In these examples, p 0 decreases in n for given and in for given n.p decreases in n for = 3=2, it increases in n for = 2 and = 3, and it increases in for given n. Expected industry pro…t and expected share of confused increase in n for = 3=2 and = 2, decrease in n for = 3, and decreases in for given n.
Conclusions
This paper develops a richer framework for the analysis of competition in homogeneous product markets where sellers compete by choosing both prices and the complexity of their price structures. Price complexity increases the cost of gathering information about prices and identifying the best deal, and is a source of consumer confusion. A distinctive feature of the proposed model is that it accommodates more general confusion technologies, which may be either concave or convex in …rms'complexity levels. Our results suggest that the characteristics of the confusion technology have an impact on market outcomes and implications for the design and assessment of competition and consumer protection policy. Furthermore, the characteristics of confusion technology can be related to consumers'cost of gathering market-wide information and to a wider range of underlying consumer behavior.
Despite product homogeneity, in markets with strategic price complexity, there is equilibrium dispersion in both prices and price complexity levels, there is a positive relationship between prices and complexity, and …rms make strictly positive pro…ts. In relatively concentrated markets, an increase in the number of competitors triggers an increase in market complexity but has ambiguous e¤ects on consumer surplus. In nearly perfectly competitive markets, although …rms use almost surely high price complexity, if the confusion technology is convex, expected industry pro…ts converge to zero, whereas, if the technology is concave, expected industry pro…ts converge to the highest level. An improvement in consumer sophistication boosts consumer welfare but does not reduce the overall complexity of the market.
Therefore, interventions which increase consumer awareness are bene…cial, but their e¤ective-ness cannot be measured by the degree of market transparency they achieve.
Appendix

Preliminary Results
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Let e S be the convex hull of S. Suppose there is a gap G e S. Let A = fp 2 S j p inf Gg, p a = max A and p 0 = sup G. Clearly, p a 2 S and F (p a ) = F (p 0 ).
(ii) (a) Suppose there is a mass point at some p 0 2 S with 0 < p 0 < max S. Then, there is a positive probability of a tie at this price. Suppose there is a mass point at p 0 = 0. In this case, all …rms make zero pro…ts. If (p 0 ) < 1, then there are some confused consumers when …rms tie at this price and …rm i is better o¤ deviating to p = 1 and making positive pro…ts on its share of confused. If (p 0 ) = 0, all consumers are experts when …rms tie, but then …rm i is better o¤ deviating to p = 1 and k i = k, where it makes positive pro…t.
(iii) It follows from (i) that in symmetric equilibrium S is a bounded interval. Suppose p h = sup S < 1. If min > 0, by (ii) …rms pricing c.d.f.s are continuous everywhere, so a …rm charging p ! p h sells only to its share of confused consumers and it is clearly better o¤ deviating to a higher price p = 1. If min = 0, there may be a positive probability of a tie at p h but, as all consumers are confused when all …rms tie, deviating to p = 1 is pro…table.
A contradiction. As p h = 1, …rms'expected pro…t in the mixed strategy equilibrium will be strictly positive, so it must be that p 0 = min S > 0.
Duopoly Analysis Expected Pro…ts
Using (10), we re-write a …rm's expected pro…ts. If …rm i chooses complexity k and charges a price p 2 [p 0 ;p), as (0) = 1, (7) becomes
If instead …rm i chooses k and charges p 2 [p; 1], expression (8) becomes
Cumulative Price Distributions
The cumulative price distribution is presented below.
Proof of Proposition 1. It is easy to see that ; p 0 ,p, and F (p) as presented in (11), (12), and (A1) are all well de…ned.
Consider a unilateral deviation to (p < p 0 ; k): The deviator's market share is equal to that corresponding to p = p 0 but, as the price is lower, this deviation is not pro…table.
Consider a unilateral deviation to (p >p; k). This results in deviation pro…t
The inequality follows as, for p >p,
(1 ) 2 = 0:
Consider a unilateral deviation to p <p; k . This results in deviation pro…t
The inequality follows as, for p <p,
Equilibrium Expected Share of Confused Consumers.
For min < 1 is strictly lower than expected industry pro…ts.
Proof of Corollary 1. Using (11), d =d = 1= 2 > 0.
Using (12), dp 0 =d = 2(1
Using (12), dp=d = 2(1 min ) min = [2 (1 min )] 2 . So, for min > 0, dp=d > 0 and min = 0, dp=d = 0.
(1 F (p)) dp + R 1 p (1 F (p)) dp + p 0 . By Leibniz's rule,
and min > 0, dF (p)=d = (1 min ) ( 1)(1 p)= 3 min p > 0. Then it follows that dE(p)=d < 0. For min = 0,p = 1 and the second integral in E(p) is a constant, so
( dF (p)=d ) dp < 0.
Conditional Price Distribution. The price distribution conditional on the price being below the cut-o¤ valuep and the corresponding conditional expected price are given by
(1 min ) (2 1) 2 ( 1)p ;
Proof of Corollary 2. Using (11), d =d min = 0.
Using (12), dp 0 =d min = 2(2 1)
Using (11), d =d min = (2 1)= 2 2 < 0.
Di¤erentiating (A2) w.r.t. min gives (3 2)= 3 < 0.
(1 F (p)) dp + R 1 p (1 F (p)) dp + p 0 . Then, by Leibniz's rule, Rp
But, for p 2 [p 0 ;p), using (A1), dF ( ( dF (p)=d min ) dp < 0.
Using (A3), it follows that
dE(p j p <p)= d min = ( (1 min ) (2 1) [2 (1 min )] 2 2 (1 min ) + 2 1 2 ( 1) ln 2 2 (1 min ) 2 (1 min ) ) < 0.
Oligopoly Analysis
Proof of Lemma 4. By (3) and (13),
For a given m, jN i M j = n m 1, so we can re-write as
As we …rst sum over all values of m (for 0 m n 1), and then over all subsets of cardinality m in }(N i ), we are e¤ectively summing up over all the subsets M in }(N i ).
Then, becomes
(1
Consider rival l's price p l . Each term in the sum above contains either (p l ) or (1 (p l )).
In fact, for each term in the summation which includes (p l ), there is a 'pair'which includes
(1 (p l )) and all other multipliers are the same. Formally, take some set
Pairing all such subsets, we can re-write the sum above by factoring out the term
where }(N i; l ) is the power set of N n fi; lg N i; l .
By iteration,
Proof of Proposition 2. Using (14), let
As (p j ) > 0 (see Lemma 4), it is easy to check that (p 0 ) < 0 and (1) > 0. Furthermore, (p) is strictly increasing in p. As changes in p only a¤ect the integration ranges in (p), d (p) dp
So, to maximize its expected pro…t a …rm i chooses according to (10), where the threshold
Proof of Proposition 3.
Step 1: Expected Pro…ts. At price p 2 [p 0 ;p), which is associated with k, …rm i's expected pro…t is
When n 1 m competitors choose k (and so price abovep p) and m competitors choose k (which happens with probability m (1 ) n 1 m ) …rm i serves 1=n of the (1 (n m 1))
confused. It also serves (n m 1) experts whenever all m …rms choosing k o¤er prices higher than p (which happens with probability ( F (p)) m (1 ) n 1 m ). This gives the term in square brackets. The term in curly brackets considers all possible combinations of n 1 taken m and gives …rm i's market share at price p.
Then, …rm i's expected pro…ts at p = p 0 and when p !p are,
At price p 2 [p; 1], which is associated with k, …rm i's expected pro…t is
When m competitors choose k (and so o¤er prices belowp < p) and n 1 m competitors choose k, …rm i serves a share 1=n of the (1 (n m)) confused consumers. The second term in square brackets considers all possible combinations of n 1 taken m. Firm i serves expert consumers only if all rivals choose high complexity (that is, if n m = n) and if it o¤ers the lowest price, as re ‡ected by the …rst term in square brackets.
Then, …rm i's expected pro…t at p =p is
Step 2: Lambda. The equilibrium probability of choosing k presented in (15) follows from,
Step 3: Equilibrium Pro…t. (16) obtains by evaluating the expected pro…t at p = 1 and using (3).
2)] n 1 1 .
Then
Step 2 implies that
] n 1 and (16) follows.
Step 4: Equilibrium Boundary Prices and Pricing Distribution Functions.
I p 0 andp are de…ned by (p 0 ; k) = and lim p!p (p; k) = , where the LHS terms are presented in (A4) and (A5), respectively, the RHS term is given by (16), and follows from (15).
Firm i's market share at p 0 -the term in curly brackets in (A4) -is larger than its market share when p !p -the term in square brackets in (A5) because (1 ) n 1 (n 1) < P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m (n m 1). This implies that p 0 <p as the equilibrium constant pro…t condition requires (p 0 ; k) = lim p!p (p; k).
Moreover,p 1; with equality i¤ (n) = 0. Using (A5) and (16),p 1 requires that 1 n
(15) implies that the LHS is equal to zero. The RHS is nonnegative and may be equal to zero
Below, we focus on the pricing c.d.f.s. Note that is de…ned in (16) and independent of p.
Di¤erentiating w.r.t. p both sides gives
In this interval, F (p) < F (p) = and the summation is strictly positive. Then, F (p) is strictly increasing in p.
It is easy to see that F (p) is strictly increasing on this interval.
Furthermore, F (p) is continuous atp, and satis…es F (p 0 ) = 0 and F (1) = 1.
Step 5: No Pro…table Unilateral Deviations.
The last inequality follows from the fact that, as p >p,
It is then easy to check using (15) that (1
Consider a unilateral deviation to p <p; k . This results in deviation pro…t.
The last inequality follows as for p <p,
+ ] n 1 = 0.
Discussion and Policy Implications
Proof of Corollary 3.
For 6 = 2, is de…ned in (15) and for = 2 it is de…ned in (17). It is easy to see that when evaluated at = 2, expression (15) reduces to (17). Therefore, this proof uses (15) to cover both cases.
Re-write (15) as (ñ) = 1 ñ 1 ( 2)ñ whereñ = n 1=(n 1) 2 (0; 1),
Using the chain rule,
lim n!1ñ = exp lim n!1 ln n 1=(n 1) = exp lim n!1 ln n n 1 = exp lim n!1 ln n n 1 . By L'Hôpital's rule, lim n!1 ln n n 1 = lim n!1 1 n = 0. So,
Proof of Corollary 4.
In this case, ( 1) < 1 and 1 + (1 )( 2) < 1.
] n g = 1, it follows that
It is convenient to write
However, the …rst inequality implies that the denominator converges faster. It follows that
I Suppose = 2. By Corollary 3, lim n!1 (1 ) = 1.
In all cases, the impact of min is straightforward.
Example 7: Expected share of confused as a function of n.
Proof of Corollary 5.
Expected industry pro…t in equilibrium is
I Consider 6 = 2. Using (16), industry pro…t can be written as
As lim n!1 1 ( 2)n 1=(n 1) = 1, it follows that
But, the RHS is lim n!1 E[1 ]. Using Corollary 4, the results follow.
I Consider = 2, using (17), lim n!1 n = lim n!1 (1 min )[ n + (1 )]. Using Corollary 3, the result follows.
I Consider 6 = 2.
Using the expressions in Corollaries 4 and 5, where the last equality uses step 3 in the proof of Proposition 3.
Then, n E[1 ] = (1 min )
[1 + (1 )( 2)] n 1 ( 2)(2 ) ( 1) n 1 > 0:
Online Appendix
Substitutability vs. Complementarity in Confusion
Recall that the pro…le of …rms'price complexity choices is k, an n vector whose i-th component is k i . The vector k i is obtained from k by omitting the i-th component, so (k i ; k i ) = k.
Denote by k m an n 1 vector with m components equal to k and the remaining n 1 m components equal to k, for 0 m n 1.
The …rms'price complexity levels determine the fraction of experts in the market, which is given by the following function ' : fk; kg n ! [0; 1] :
An increase in one …rm's price complexity level lowers the comparability of competing o¤ers and therefore the fraction of experts in the market, so '(k; k i ) > '( k; k i ) for all i 2 N .
For expositional simplicity and without loss of generality, let '(k; k n 1 ) = 1. To capture the impact of a rival's price complexity on the di¢ culty of evaluating a …rm's o¤er let '(k; k m ) '( k; k m ) = ('(k; k m 1 ) '( k; k m 1 )) 1 ;
for > 1. Using '(k; k n 1 ) = 1, (2) implies that 1 '( k; k n 1 ) = ('(k; k m ) '( k; k m )) ( 1) n 1 m = ('(k; k 0 ) '( k; k 0 )) ( 1) n 1 :
As '( k; k m ) = '(k; k m 1 ), using (3),
Case 1. Substitutability in Confusion. When 1 < < 2, the confusion technology,
(1 '), satis…es strictly decreasing di¤ erences.
Formally, for 2 (1; 2), 1 '( k; k m ) (1 '(k; k m )) > 1 '( k; k m 1 ) (1 '(k; k m 1 )) :
so that a …rm's incremental increase in price complexity is more e¤ective in creating confusion when rivals'price complexity is lower (in the sense that fewer competitors employ k).
Case 2. Complementarity in Confusion. When > 2, the confusion technology,
(1 '), satis…es strictly increasing di¤ erences.
so that a …rm's incremental increase in price complexity is more e¤ective when rivals'price complexity is higher.
Case 3. No Second Order E¤ects in Confusion. When = 2, the price complexity of one …rm does not a¤ ect the e¤ ectiveness of an increase in a rival's complexity.
1 '( k; k m ) (1 '(k; k m )) = 1 '( k; k m 1 ) (1 '(k; k m 1 )) :
so that a …rm's incremental increase in price complexity is independent of rivals'price complexity levels.
Proof of Proposition 4. First note that the incremental pro…tability of an increase in complexity in this case is given by i p; k i (p; k) = p R 1 p ::: But, at p = p 0 , the term above is negative, while at p = 1, it is positive. As F (p) is strictly increasing in p, p; k i (p; k) < 0 for p <p and …rms choose k, while p; k i (p; k) > 0 for p >p and …rms choose k. The cut-o¤ pricep solves (1 F (p)) n 1 = 1=n.
Step 1 in the proof of Proposition 3 carries over unchanged. Then, the constant pro…t condition requires that (p; k) = lim p!p p; k ,
(1 ) n 1 ( (n 1) (n)) = 1 n P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m ( (n m 1) (n m)) ,
(1 ) n 1 = 1 n P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m ,
(1 ) n 1 = 1 n and (17) follows.
Equilibrium pro…t (as a function of ) obtains by evaluating the expected pro…t at p = 1 and using (4).
1; k = P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m (1 (n m)) n =
(1 (n)) P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m (n m) n 2 =
(1 (n)) + n(1 ) n 2
and (18) follows.
Below, we identify the equilibrium boundary prices and pricing c.d.f.s.
(p 0 ; k) = p 0 P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m (n m 1) + 1 n (1 (n m 1)) = p 0 P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m 1 n 1 n (1 (n m 1)) = p 0 1 (1 (n)) (n 1) 2 (1 ) n 2 .
Then, using (p 0 ; k) = , where the RHS is de…ned in (18), it follows that p 0 = (1 (n))[ + n(1 )] n 2 (1 (n))(n 1) 2 (1 ) .
p; k =p (1 ) n 1 (n) + P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m (1 (n m)) n = p (1 ) n 1 (n) + (1 (n)) + n(1 ) n 2 .
Then, using p; k = , where the RHS is de…ned in (18), it follows that p = (1 (n))[ + n(1 )] n (1 (n))(n 1) .
It is easy to check thatp 1; with equality if and only if (n) = 0, and that p 0 <p.
F (p) is implicitly determined by (k; p) = and ( k; p) = .
For p 2 [p 0 ;p), F (p) solves P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 ( F (p)) m (1 ) n 1 m (n m 1) + m (1 ) n 1 m (1 (n m 1)) n = p , P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 ( F (p)) m (1 ) n 1 m (n m 1) + P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m (1 (n m 1)) n = p , 1 n (1 F (p)) n 2 f(1 )[1 + (n)(n 1)] + ( F (p))ng + P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m (1 (n m 1)) n = p :
It is straightforward to see that both the LHS and the RHS above are decreasing in F (p). So F (p) is strictly increasing in p in this interval.
For p 2 [p; 1]; if (n) > 0, F (p) solves
(1 F (p)) n 1 (n) + P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m (1 (n m)) n = p ,
(1 F (p)) n 1 (n) + (1 (n)) n 2 P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m (n m) = p
(1 F (p)) n 1 (n) + (1 (n)) + n(1 ) n 2 = p
(1 F (p)) n 1 (n) = 1 p 1 .
It is easy to see that F (p) is strictly increasing in this interval.
No Pro…table Unilateral Deviations.
Consider a unilateral deviation to (p >p; k). This results in deviation pro…t d (p; k) = p (1 F (p)) n 1 (n 1) + 1 n P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 (1 ) n 1 m m (1 (n m 1)) .
But d (p; k) < p; k ,
(1 F (p)) n 1 ( (n 1) (n)) < 1 n P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m ( (n m 1) (n m)) ,
(1 F (p)) n 1 < 1 n P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 m (1 ) n 1 m , (1 F (p)) n 1 < 1 n as (1 F (p)) n 1 <
(1 ) n 1 .
But, d p; k < (p; k) as P n 1 m=0 C m n 1 (1 ) n 1 m ( (n m 1) (n m))[ ( F (p)) m + m n ] < 0 ,
